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Abstract—As one type of machine-learning model, a “decision-
tree ensemble model” (DTEM) is represented by a set of decision
trees. A DTEM is mainly known to be valid for structured data;
however, like other machine-learning models, it is difficult to
train so that it returns the correct output value for any input
value. Accordingly, when a DTEM is used in regard to a system
that requires reliability, it is important to comprehensively detect
input values that lead to malfunctions of a system (failures) dur-
ing development and take appropriate measures. One conceivable
solution is to install an input filter that controls the input to the
DTEM, and to use separate software to process input values that
may lead to failures. To develop the input filter, it is necessary
to specify the filtering condition of the input value that leads
to the malfunction of the system. Given that necessity, in this
paper, we propose a method for formally verifying a DTEM
and, according to the result of the verification, if an input value
leading to a failure is found, extracting the range in which such
an input value exists. The proposed method can comprehensively
extract the range in which the input value leading to the failure
exists; therefore, by creating an input filter based on that range,
it is possible to prevent the failure occurring in the system. In
this paper, the algorithm of the proposed method is described,
and the results of a case study using a dataset of house prices
are presented. On the basis of those results, the feasibility of the
proposed method is demonstrated, and its scalability is evaluated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, software developed by machine learning has been
used in various systems. Deep learning using deep neural
networks (DNNs) is widely used for predicting and classifying
image data, audio data [1] [2], and so on. For structured
data, ensemble learning methods using decision trees, such
as random forests [3] and gradient-boosting decision trees [4],
are also effective [5] [6] [7] [13] [8] [9] [10] [11].
A decision-tree ensemble model (DTEM) is represented as
a set of decision trees. The prediction result output from a
DTEM is calculated as the sum or average value of the scores
associated with the leaves of the decision trees. The DTEM is
expected to be generalized, namely, to return the appropriate
output value even if it is given an input value not included in
the training data.
However, in general, it is difficult to train a DTEM to
return the appropriate output value for every input value, that
is, a DTEM returns an inappropriate output value with a
certain probability. Therefore, in particular, when a DTEM is
used in a mission-critical system, whose behavior significantly
affects business and society, it is important to comprehensively
detect input values that lead to system failures during devel-
opment, and take appropriate measures. As countermeasures,
retraining or additional training of the DTEM are possible
means; however, for the reason mentioned above, it is difficult
to completely eliminate the possibility of failures occurring.
Accordingly, as a practical measure, it is possible to create
an input filter to control the input value to the DTEM and to
use separate software to process the filtered input values that
leads to failures (Fig. 1). The implementation of the separate
software is arbitrary. For example, the input value might be
rejected to be processed.
Fig. 1. Input filter
A policing function [12] is also useful to prevent failures. It
is separated from the DTEM, and checks the output value of
the DTEM againtst a certain property at runtime. If the output
value does not meet the property, that is, the output value leads
to failures, the policing function controls the output value.
However, when comparing the input filter and the policing
function, the input filter is more efficient because the input
filter detects and controls failures before the DTEM runs.
To create the input filter, it is necessary to specify which
input values should be filtered as the filtering condition. In
this paper, we therefore propose a method to formally verify
whether a DTEM meets certain property and, if that properties
is not satisfied, extracts the range (part of the input-value
space) in which all input values violating the property are
included. By setting the range extracted by the proposed
method as the filtering condition of the input filter, it is
possible to prevent the failure of the system due to the
DTEM. The feasibility of the proposed method is evaluated
by showing a case study in which the proposed method
was applied experimentally. Moreover, the scalability of the
proposed method is evaluated by changing the dimension of
the input values of the DTEM, the number of decision trees
constituting the DTEM, and the maximum value of the depth
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of those decision trees. Hereafter, input values that violate the
property are referred to as “violating input values.” And the
range in which the violating input value exists is called the
“violation range.” It should be noted that not all input values
included in the violation range will be violating input values.
As for the proposed method, the decision trees that compose
the DTEM are encoded to a formula, and the formula is
verified by using a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver.
Although this approach has mainly been applied to DNNs [15]
[16] [17] [18] [14] [19], to the authors’ knowledge, no case in
which this approach is applied to a DTEM has been reported.
Given that situation, the first contribution of this paper is to
demonstrate that our approach, namely, logically encoding a
machine-learning model and verifying the model by solving
the resulting a formula with an SMT solver, is also applicable
to a DTEM.
When the DTEM violates a property, as a result of the
verification, an example of a violating input value (and its
corresponding output value)—called a “counterexample”—is
obtained. As a naive way to get the filtering condition, all vio-
lating input values are detected by repeating the verification. If
an input value matches any violating input values, it is filtered.
However, a large number of similar violating input values may
exist around a certain violating input value. In particular, if the
input value is represented by a multidimensional vector whose
elements are numeric variables (not categorical variables),
input values obtained by slightly changing the values of some
elements of the violating input value are also likely to violate
the property. In this case, since the verification is repeated
as many times as the number of the violating input values,
detecting all the violating input values is not practical in terms
of calculation time.
Targeting a DTEM whose input values are multi-
dimensional vectors whose elements are numeric variables,
the proposed method extracts the violation range by searching
around the origin at which a violating input value was first
detected and gradually expanding the search range until the
violating input value is not detected. With this method, the
violating input values around the origin can be kept within
the range. However, input values that do not violate the
property are also included in the range. Even though they
do not violate the property, they are also filtered as well as
the violating input values. Thus, it is desireble to prevent as
many input values that do not violate the property as possible
from being included in the violation range. Therefore, as for
the proposed method, the extracted violation range is divided
into a number of smaller ranges. Then, for each divided
range, whether a violating input value exists within the range
is checked. As a result, it is possible to narrow down the
original violation range. As for the second contribution of this
paper, targeting a DTEM taking multi-dimensional vectors of
numerical variables as input values, we propose a method to
extract the violation range and narrow it down. Moreover, the
feasibility and scalability of the proposed method are evaluated
through a case study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a
decision tree and a DTEM are formally defined. In Section III,
the proposed method is overviewed. In Section IV, among the
procedures that compose the proposed method, the procedure
for verifying the DTEM is explained. In Section V, the
procedure for extracting the violation range on the basis of the
verification result is explained. In Section VI, the procedure
for narrowing down by dividing the extracted violation range
is explained. In Section VII, the feasibility and scalability of
the proposed method are evaluated through a case study using
a data set of house prices. In Section VIII, the usefulness
and applicability of the proposed method are discussed. In
Section IX, related work is described, and in Section X, the
conclusions drawn from this study are presented.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For any DTEM M , variables representing input and output
values of M are given as x and y, respectively. It is assumed
that x is represented by a vector of length s ≥ 2 such that
[x[0], ..., x[k], ..., x[s − 1]]. As for M targeted in this paper,
since multi-dimensional vectors with numeric variables as
elements are assumed as input values, x[0], ..., x[k], ..., x[s−1]
represents each numeric variable. And the domain of M is
represented as X . First, in Section II-A, the decision trees
that compose M are formally defined. Next, in Section II-B,
M is formally defined.
A. Decision Tree
A decision tree represents a procedure for determining the
class to which a given input value belongs [20] [21]. A
decision tree consists of decision nodes, edges, and leaf nodes.
The expression of input value x is associated with the decision
node (Fig. 2). In this paper, the expression of the decision node
is called an “attribute test.” Each decision node has multiple
child nodes, and each child node is connected by an edge.
Each edge is labeled with the evaluation result of the attribute
test. When an input value is given, the edge with the same
label as the result of evaluating the attribute test is selected.
Hereafter, the evaluation result of the attribute test is called
the “test value.” If the child node connected to the selected
Fig. 2. Structure of decision tree
edge is a decision node, the same procedure is performed
for that decision node. If the child node is a leaf node, the
value associated with that leaf node becomes the name of the
class to which the input value belongs. As for the decision
trees making up the DTEM, numeric values are used as class
names, and those numeric values are used to calculate the
output value of the DTEM. Hereafter, this value is called “the
decision value.”
Arbitrary decision tree t constituting M can be expressed
in the form (Nd, Nl, n1, E, attr, tv, dv), where Nd represents
a set of decision nodes, Nl represents a set of leaf nodes, and
n1 represents a root node included in Nd. E is a set of edges,
each of which edge is represented by a pair consisting of
a connection-source node and a connection-destination node.
That is, it can be defined as E ⊆ Nd × (Nl ∪ (Nd \ {n1})).
Here, attr : Nd −→ A is a function that associates an attribute
test with a decision node. A represents a set of arbitrary
expressions for input value x. Similarly, tv : E −→ V is
a function that associates a test value with an edge, where
V represents a set of test values. In the example in Fig. 2,
V = {True, False}. Here, dv : Nl −→ R is a function that
associates a decision value with a leaf node. The decision tree
is acyclic. This is defined, by using transitive closure E+ of
E, as ∀n ∈ Nd ∪Nl · 〈n, n〉 6∈ E+.
It is assumed that the decision tree that constitutes the
DTEM, which is the subject of this paper, has more than one
decision nodes, and branches from a decision node to at least
two child nodes. Therefore, if the number of nodes included
in Nd is expressed as card(Nd), card(Nd) ≥ 1 holds. In
a similar manner, card(Nl) ≥ 2 is established. As for the
number of edges, card(E), card(E) ≥ 2 holds.
B. Decision Tree Ensemble Model(DTEM)
Arbitrary M can be expressed as (T, ensem). T represents
a set of decision trees constituting M . If the number of deci-
sion trees included in T is taken as card(T ), the decision trees
included in T can be expressed as t1, ..., ti, ..., tcard(T ). The
decision values of trees t1, ..., ti, ..., tcard(T ) are represented
as y1, ..., yi, ..., ycard(T ), respectively.
Moreover, ensem represents a function that takes
y1, ..., ycard(T ) as arguments and returns y. The specification
of ensem depends on the implementation of DTEM. For
example, in the case of random forests, the average of the
decision values is y. Alternatively, in the case of a gradient-
boosting decision tree, the sum of the decision values is y. In
this paper, the calculations depending on the implementation
of the DTEM are generalized with ensem.
III. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed method is outlined in Algorithm 1. As for the
proposed method, M is taken as the DTEM to be verified. A
property of M is denoted by ϕ, and X represents a domain of
M . Parameters ra, rb, and rc are described later. Algorithm 1
outputs the value of variable vranges, which is a set of viola-
tion ranges for ϕ. Function input is within on line 2 returns
formula ρ, meaning that “Input value x of M is included in do-
main X .” Procedure formal verification on line 4 verifies
whether an input value that violates ϕ and satisfies constraint
Algorithm 1 Violation Ranges Detection
Input: M , ϕ, X , ra, rb, rc
Output: vranges
1: vranges ← ∅
2: ρ ← input is within(M , X)
3: while True do
4: ce ← formal verification(M , ϕ, ρ)
5: if ce 6= None then
6: vio, novios ← range extraction(ce, M , ϕ, ρ,
ra, X)
7: core← vio
8: while continue division(core, X , rb)
9: ∧ novios 6= ∅ do
10: iv ← novios.pop()
11: core, surrds ← range division(core, iv, ρ,
rc, M , ϕ)
12: vranges ← vranges ∪ surrds
13: end while
14: vranges ← vranges ∪ core
15: ρ ← ρ ∧ input is outside(M , vio)
16: else
17: break
18: end if
19: end while
20: return vranges
ρ. If such an input value is detected, that value is assigned
to variable ce. If no such input value is detected, “None” is
assigned to ce. Procedure formal verification is described
in detail in Section IV. Procedure range extraction on line
6 extracts the violation range for ϕ from around ce. The
extracted range is assigned to variable vio. Moreover, a range
in which no input value violates ϕ is extracted by the process
of extracting vio; therefore, a set of such ranges is output as
variable novios. Hereafter, a range in which no violating input
value exists is referred to as a “no-violation range.” Procedure
range extraction is shown in detail in Section V.
The extracted violation range, vio, is divided as follows.
First, on line 7, vio is copied to variable core. On line 8,
continue division is a function that returns a decision of
whether to execute procedure range division on line 11.
Parameter rb is used as a reference value for the decision.
Although the details of continue division are not specified
here, for example, it can be implementated so as to return
“True” if the volume of core is equal to or more than rb percent
of the volume of X . On line 11, procedure range division
divides core into multiple pieces. This division is performed
on the basis of a no-violation range, which is an element of
novios. Of the ranges obtained by division, the inner range
including ce (which is the starting point of range extension)
is taken as a new core, and the set of other outer ranges is
taken as surrds. The range division is explained in detail
in Section VI.
If novios contains a number of no-violation ranges, it is
used for the division from the range pushed to novios last,
which is the outermost no-violation range in terms of violating
input value ce. Therefore, the ranges stored in surrds do
not include no-violation ranges because they are outside the
outermost no-violation range. Accordingly, the elements of
surrds are added to vranges without dividing them further
(line 12). On the contrary, the new core might include a
no-violation range. Therefore, on line 8, it is evaluated by
continue division whether core will be divided further. If
core is not divided any more, it is added to vranges.
Then, on line 15, function input is outside is used to cre-
ate a constraint representing “Input value x of M is out of the
range indicated by vio.”, and that constraint is conjunctively
appended to ρ. After that, by re-executing formal verification
on line 4, it is verified whether an input value violates ϕ
outside vio. If an input value that violates ϕ is detected as
a result of the verification, the violation range is extracted
and divided by the same procedure. vranges extracted by
Algorithm 1 represents the range in which an input value
violates ϕ. Therefore, by creating an input filter (shown in
Fig. 1) based on vranges, it is possible to filter the violating
input value.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF DECISION TREE
ENSEMBLE MODEL
The procedure of formal verification in Algorithm 1 is
shown in detail hereafter. For any decision tree ti ∈ T that
constitutes DTEM M , a set of all paths extractable from ti
is denoted by Pi. As stated in Section II-A, since a decision
tree is assumed to be acyclic, the elements of Pi are paths of
finite length. Arbitrary path p ∈ Pi can be represented by a
sequence of nodes, np1, n
p
2, ..., n
p
d, n
p
d+1. Among these nodes,
np1, ..., n
p
d represent decision nodes, and n
p
d+1 represents a leaf
node. Since ti has one or more decision nodes, 1 ≤ d holds.
Here, the specification of an arbitrary path p of ti is defined
as fpi by using functions attr, tv, and dv (defined in Section
II-A) as follows:
fpi
def
=
 d∧
j=1
attr(npj )(x) = tv(〈npj , npj+1〉)

→ (yi = dv(npd+1)) (1)
The argument 〈npj , npj+1〉 of function tv represents an edge
between nodes npj and n
p
j+1. By using f
p
i , the specification
Fi of ti is expressed as follows:
Fi
def
=
∧
p∈Pi
fpi (2)
As explained in Section II-B, the output value y of M is cal-
culated by ensem from decision values y1, ..., yi, ..., ycard(T ).
Therefore, the specification of M is expressed by FM by using
ensem and fpi as follows:
FM
def
=
card(T )∧
i=1
Fi

∧ y = ensem(y1, ..., yi, ..., ycard(T )) (3)
Furthermore, F is defined by using ϕ (i.e., a property to be
satisfied by M ) and constraint ρ (which indicates that x is
included in domain X) as follows:
F
def
= FM ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ ρ (4)
F is input into the SMT solver to determine its satisfiability. If
F is unsatisfiable, it is guaranteed that no input value satisfies
ϕ in the range constrained by ρ. If x and y satisfying F
are detected, the detected x is returned as the violating input
value, ce. It is thus possible to verify whether M satisfies ϕ
by encoding M to formula F and solving the satisfiability
problem by using the SMT solver.
V. VIOLATION RANGE EXTRACTION
A. Overview
As for range extraction, a violating input value is
searched in the range around violating input value ce as a
starting point by using formal verification. If a violating
input value is detected, the range is extracted as the violation
range. Here, to promote intuitive understanding, it is assumed
that variable x representing the input value of M is represented
by a two-dimensional vector, namely, [x[0]], x[1]]. The method
for extracting the violation range by range extraction is
outlined in Fig. 3. The violation range is extended by alter-
Fig. 3. Violation range extraction by range extraction
nately increasing the values of x[0] and x[1]. In step (1), the
violating input value obtained on line 4 of Algorithm 1 is set
as the initial value of the violation range. Next, in step (2),
a search range is set from the initial value to upper direction
of x[0], and whether a violating input value exists within that
search range is verified by the method described in Section
IV. If a violating input value is detected in the search range,
as shown in step (3), the search range is imported into the
violation range. In step (4), the search range is set to upper
direction of x[1]. From then on, the same procedure is repeated
to extend the violation range. Although omitted in Fig. 3, in a
similar manner as described above, the violation range is also
extended to lower directions of x[0] and x[1].
As for range extraction, at the same time the violation
range is extracted, no-violation ranges existing in that range
are extracted. The method of extracting no-violation ranges is
outlined in Fig. 4. In step (1) of Fig. 4, the search range is
Fig. 4. No-violation range extraction by range extraction
set in the x[0] upper direction. Here, it is assumed that no
violating input value exists in the search range. In that case,
the no-violation range is created as shown in step (2). After
the violation range is extended in the x[1] upper direction in
step (3), the search range is reset in the x[0] direction in step
(4). If a violating input value still does not exist in the search
range, the no-violation range set in step (2) is extended by step
(5). It is assumed that the violation range can be extended in
steps (6), (7), and (8). In that case, the extension of the no-
violation range is ended. Accordingly, when no violating input
value exists in the search range, the search range is extracted
as the no-violation range. As shown in step (9), a plurality
of no-violation ranges may be created. One of the features of
the proposed method is to extract this no-violation range. The
extracted no-violation range is the utilized in range division
described in Section VI.
Regarding the proposed method, as a strategy for extending
the violation range, alternately increasing the values of x[0]
and x[1] is adopted. Other strategies, however, may be consid-
ered to extend the violation range. For example, a strategy by
which the values of x[0] and x[1] are increased simultaneously
can be considered. Strategies for extending the violation range
are discussed in Section VIII.
B. Algorithm
The procedure of range extraction is shown in detail in
Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 returns vio, which represents a
Algorithm 2 Algorithm of range extraction
Input: ce, M , ϕ, ρ, ra, X
Output: vio, novios
1: vio[lower] ← ce
2: vio[upper] ← ce
3: novios ← ∅
4: tmp nv[lower] ← [None] * s
5: tmp nv[upper] ← [None] * s
6: cont flag ← True
7: while cont flag = True do
8: cont flag ← False
9: for each k in {0, ..., s− 1} do
10: rtn upper ← EXPAND(upper, k, vio, tmp nv,
ρ, M , ϕ, X)
11: rtn lower ← EXPAND(lower, k, vio, tmp nv,
ρ, M , ϕ, X)
12: if rtn upper = True ∨ rtn lower = True then
13: cont flag ← True
14: end if
15: end for
16: end while
17: return vio, novios
18: procedure EXPAND(dir, k, vio, tmp nv, ρ, M , ϕ, X)
19: sr ← vio
20: if dir = upper then
21: sr[dir][k] ← vio[dir][k] + mgn(ra)[k]
22: else // dir = lower
23: sr[dir][k] ← vio[dir][k] - mgn(ra)[k]
24: end if
25: sr[opposite(dir)][k] ← vio[dir][k]
26: sr ← intersection(X , sr)
27: ρ′ ← ρ ∧ input is within(M , sr)
28: ce′ ← formal verification(M , ϕ, ρ′)
29: if ce′ 6= None then
30: vio[dir][k] ← sr[dir][k]
31: if tmp nv[dir][k] 6= None then
32: novios.push(tmp nv[dir][k])
33: tmp nv[dir][k] ← None
34: end if
35: return True
36: else
37: tmp nv[dir][k] ← sr
38: return False
39: end if
40: end procedure
violation range for ϕ , and novios, which represents a range in
which no violating input value exists. The violation range can
be defined by the lower-limit values and the upper-limit values
of variables x[0], ..., x[s − 1]. Therefore, it is supposed that
violation range vio is composed of vio[lower] and vio[upper],
where lower and upper represent 0 and 1 respectively. Here,
the lower-limit value of variables x[k] (0 ≤ k ≤ s − 1) is
represented by vio[lower][k]. Similarly, the upper-limit value
is represented by vio[upper][k].
First, on lines 1 and 2, vio is initialized with ce. On line
7, whether vio has been extended in the previous loop is
checked, and if vio has been extended, a further extension
is tried. On line 9, the variable for which the range is to be
expanded, x[k], is selected. For the selected x[k] here, line 10
attempts to expand the upper limit of the variable, and line
11 tries to expand the lower limit of the variable. If neither
the upper limit nor the lower limit can be expanded for all
variables x[0], ..., x[s−1], cont flag = False is returned, and
the procedure ends.
The upper and lower limits are extended on lines 10 and
11 by EXPAND. The procedure of EXPAND is described
below with the case that the upper limit is expanded taken
as an example. The parameter dir of EXPAND represents
the direction of expansion. That is, in this example, upper
is passed as an argument. On line 19, variable sr is initialized
with vio. where sr represents the search range. On lines 21
and 25, sr for variable x[k] is updated. opposite is a function
that returns the direction opposite to the extension direction
indicated by dir. mgn is a function that accepts parameter ra
as an argument and returns a vector of the same length as x.
Vector mgn(ra) is used to set the search range of x[k] to the
range vio[upper][k] < x[k] ≤ (vio[upper][k] +mgn(ra)[k]).
Because the search range of variable x[k′](k′ 6= k) is not up-
dated, it is given as vio[lower][k′] ≤ x[k′] ≤ vio[upper][k′].
As a result, sr is created on the upper bound of vio in the
x[k] direction.
When sr is defined, the upper-limit or lower-limit value
of sr is sometimes not included in the search range, that is,
the search range is defined by using “¡” or “¿.” Accordingly,
it is necessary to hold that information about with-equal or
without-equal. In this paper, to simplify explanation, it is
omitted how to keep that information in sr. The function
intersection on line 26 redefines the common range of X
and sr as a new sr. As the violation range is extended, sr is
eventually created outside X , and then their common ranges
become empty. In this way, the termination of the procedure
is assured.
On line 27, ρ′ is created by conjunctively appending the
constraint “the input value for M is included in sr” to ρ. Line
28 verifies whether M satisfies ϕ under constraint ρ′. As a
result of verification, if the violating input value is detected
within sr, the upper limit of the violation range, vio[upper],
is extended to sr[upper] (line 30).
Lines 31, 33, and 37 create an element of novios. If no
violating input value is detected in the search range as a
result of the verification on line 28, the search range is saved
in tmp nv[upper][k] (line 37). tmp nv[upper][k] stores a
tentative no-violation range in the x[k] upper direction. The
range stored in tmp nv[upper][k] will be extended as long
as a violating input value is not detected in the x[k] upper
direction (line 37). If a violating input value is detected in
that direction, the latest range stored in tmp nv[upper][k] is
finalized as a no-violation range and added to novios (line
32).
VI. VIOLATION RANGE DIVISION
A. Overview
As for range division, violation range core extracted by
range extraction is divided. The division is based on a no-
violation range, which is an element of novios. Among the
divided ranges, the range including violating input value ce
(which is the starting point of the range extension) is set as a
new core, and the other ranges are called surs. If sur includes
a violating input value, it is added to surrds. Since it is
possible to repeatedly divide core, the number of ranges in
surrds may be increased with each division. For example, as
for the violation range shown in step (9) in Fig. 4, the method
of range division is outlined in Fig. 5 In Fig. 5, first, the
Fig. 5. Violation range divided by range division
violation range is divided at the upper-limit value of the no-
violation range on the x[1] axis. Next, the range is divided
at the upper-limit value of the no-violation range on the x[0]
axis. Finally, the range is further divided by using the lower-
limit value of the no-violation range on the x[0] axis. As a
result this division, the violation range is divided into three
ranges: sur(i), sur(ii), and core.
It is clear that there exits a violating input value in core
because core includes violating input value ce at least. sur(i)
also includes another violating input values in this case since
the violation range was extended as shown in step (8) in Fig.
4. However, sur(ii) may not include a violating input value.
Whether sur(ii) include a violating input value can be checked
by using formal verification. If sur(ii) does not include a
violating input value, it is removed from the violation range.
This method aims to narrow the violation range by dividing
it and verifying whether outer ranges surs created by the
division include violating input values. This is based on the
assumption that outer ranges of the no-violation range are also
likely not to include a violating input value. Outer ranges are
“adjacent to” the no-violation range and also “beyond” the no-
violation range from the starting point of the range extension.
Accordingly, input values in outer ranges are assumed to
be “similar to” the input values in the no-violation range
and also “more different” from violating input values around
the starting point than the input values in the no-violation
range. Therefore, we consider that outer ranges created by
the division on the basis of the no-violation range are likely
to include no violating input value.
When dividing the violation range on the basis of the no-
violation range, the order of the division can be changed. For
example, the dividing order shown in Fig. 6 can be considered.
In this case, the division is performed in the following order:
at the upper-limit value of the no-violating range on the x[0]
axis, at the upper-limit value on the x[1] axis, and at the lower-
limit value on the x[0] axis.
Fig. 6. Another order of dividing based on no-violation range
It is said that the dividing order that makes the violation
range narrower is more effective. However, the extent to which
the violation range can be narrowed by a certain dividing
order depends on the DTEM and property to be verified.
It is therefore not known which dividing order is effective
unless the division is actually performed. Accordingly, as for
the proposed method, multiple divisions are tried at random,
and the order that makes the violation range the narrowest is
adopted.
The violation range is divided by the surface of the no-
violation range (corresponding to the dotted lines in Fig. 5
and Fig. 6). Since the no-violation range is an s-dimensional
hyperrectangle, the number of dividing planes is 2s. Therefore,
the number of ways to divide the violation range is (2s)!
As for the proposed method, dividing orders, whose number
equals parameter rc, are randomly selected and the results
of the divisions are compared according to the sum of the
hypervolumes of the ranges in surrds. The dividing order
that minimizes the sum of the hypervolumes is adopted
B. Algorithm
The procedure of range division is shown in details in
Algorithm 3. In Algorithm 3, violation range core is divided
on the basis of no-violation range iv. Then, as a result
of division, a new core and surrds are returned. On line
1, calc planes extracts the (s-1)-dimensional hyperplanes
constituting hyperrectangle iv, and creates the set planes. The
number of elements in planes is 2s. On line 2, permutate
creates as many arbitrary dividing orders using elements of
planes as rc, and the set of the created dividing orders is
assined to orders. Line 4 picks out arbitrary element od
of orders. od is an array (with length of 2s) having the
hyperplanes constituting iv as elements. On line 7, the top
element of od is assined to plane. By slice core on line
8, core is divided with plane as the dividing plane. Of the
two ranges created by the division, the range that includes
ce is taken as the new core, and the other is taken as
sur. formal verification on line 10 verifies whether the
Algorithm 3 Algorithm of range division
Input: core, iv, ρ, rc, M , ϕ
Output: core, surrds
1: planes ← calc planes(iv)
2: orders ← permutate(plane, rc)
3: results ← ∅
4: for each od in orders do
5: core ← core
6: while od 6= ∅ do
7: plane ← od.pop()
8: core, sur ← slice core(core, plane)
9: ρ′ ← ρ ∧ input is within(M , sur)
10: ce′ ← formal verification(M , ϕ, ρ′)
11: if ce′ 6= None then
12: surrds ← surrds ∪ sur
13: end if
14: end while
15: volume ← calc volume sum(core, surrds)
16: results ← results ∪ {((core, surrds), volume)}
17: end for
18: (core, surrds) ← min volume(results)
19: return core, surrds
violating input value is included in the range of that sur. If
a violating input value exists within the range of sur, sur is
added to surrds (line 12). The division with plane is repeated
for each element of od. On line 15, calc volume sum is
used to calculate the sum of the hypervolumes of the violation
range represented by the elements of core and surrds. The
procedures from lines 5 to 16 are repeated according to the
number of elements of orders, that is, rc times. In this manner,
for each dividing order randomly created on line 2, core and
surrds, which are division results, and volume, which is the
sum of the hypervolumes, are obtained. On line 18, the result
of division that gives the smallest volume is extracted by
function min volume, and is used as the final return value.
In this way, the violation range is divided by
range division on the basis of the no-violation range
created by range extraction. It should be noted that
range division is not executed if no-violation range is
created by range extraction.
VII. CASE STUDY
A. Setup
As a subject of the case study, DTEM M is created by
using a dataset of house prices 1 as a training data set.
XGBoost [13] was adopted to implement M . M receives a 7-
dimensional vector, x = [x[0], ..., x[6]], as an input value, and
returns a house price as output value y, where x[0], ..., x[6]
are, respectively, grade of house, condition of house, number
of bedrooms, size of living room, size of parking space, size
of ground floor, and size of basement. The number of decision
1https://www.kaggle.com/harlfoxem/housesalesprediction
trees constituting M is 100, and the maximum depth of each
decision tree is 3. As properties to be verified, ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3
are defined as follows:
ϕ1
def
= x[0] ≥ 7000⇒ y ≥ 500000 (5)
ϕ2
def
= y > 50000 (6)
ϕ3
def
= y < 10000000 (7)
Here, x[0] in ϕ1 represents size of living room. The larger the
living room, the higher the price. Therefore, it is defined as
ϕ1 that if the size of the living room is 7000 or more, the
price is 500,000 or more. Moreover, the price output by M is
expected to be realistic in regard to a house price. Accordingly,
ϕ2 is defined as expressing that the price is higher than 50,000.
Similarly, ϕ2 is taken as the property that the price is less than
10,000,000.
Next, domain X of x is defined. In this case study, X is
defined on the basis of the maximum and minimum values of
the training dataset. For each variable x[k] (0 ≤ k ≤ 6), the
maximum value included in the training dataset is represented
as maxk, and the minimum value is similarly represented as
maxk. These values are used to define X as follows:
X
def
= {[x[0], ..., x[k], ..., x[s− 1]]
| ∀k ·mink ≤ x[k] ≤ maxk} (8)
Function mgn (which determines the search range in
range extraction) is implemented with parameter ra as an
argument as follows:
mgn(ra)
def
= [m[0], ...,m[k], ...,m[s− 1]], such that{ ∀k ·m[k] = maxk −mink)/ra (x[k] ∈ R)
∀k ·m[k] = ceil((maxk −mink)/ra) (x[k] ∈ Z)
(9)
Here, mgn(ra)[k] is created on the basis of the width of the
domain X (i.e., the difference between maxk and mink),
where function ceil rounds up a real number to an integer.
In this case study, ra = 100 is supposed. continue division
shown in Algorithm 1 is implemented so as to return “True”
if the hypervolume of core is rb percent or more of the
hypervolume of X . In this case study, rb = 10 is also sup-
posed. Furthermore, parameter rc for determining the number
of elements of orders in range division is taken as rc = 10.
The proposed method was implemented in Python 2. The
Z3 Theorem Prover [36] was used as a SMT solver in
formal verification. Moreover, this case study was per-
formed on a Windows 10 R© PC equipped with two Intel R©
CoreTM i7-8700 3.2-GHz processor with 6 cores, 16-GB
memory.
B. Results and Evaluation
The results of applying the proposed method are listed
in Table I. The violation range detected by the proposed
2Available on https://github.com/hitachi-rd-yokohama
/deep saucer/tree/master/xgb encoding
method is shown in column (b) for each property shown
in column (a). In column (b), the violation range before
division by range division and the violation range after
division are shown. In column (c), the hypervolume of each
violation range is shown. Column (d) shows a value obtained
by dividing the sum of hypervolumes of the violation range
after division by the sum of hypervolumes of the violation
range before division. This value is used to evaluate the effect
of narrowing the violation range by range division. Column
(e) shows the time elapsed to execute the proposed method.
Column (f) shows the time taken to execute the SMT solver
as part of the method. Column (g) shows the number of times
of the SMT solver is executed (i.e., number of calls), and
column (h) shows the result of dividing (f) by (g), that is,
the average execution time per run of the SMT solver. As a
result of executing formal verification for ϕ1, a violating
input value was detected. Then, starting from the detected
violating input value, range extraction is executed, and the
violation range shown in #1-1 is extracted. Moreover, by
dividing this violation range by range division, the violation
ranges shown in #1-1-1 to #1-1-5 were obtained. This division
reduced the hypervolume of the violation range to about 74
percent of the hypervolume before the division.
Similarly, with respect to ϕ2, the violation ranges shown
in #2-1 and #2-2 were extracted by range extraction. In
this case, the division by range division was not performed
because the hypervolume of each violation range was less than
rb = 10 % of the hypervolume of X . However, it is confirmed
that when rb is 0.1, range division reduces the hypervolume
of the violation range to about 33% of the violation range
before the division. As for ϕ3, no violating input value was
detected. That is, it was confirmed that M satisfies ϕ3.
The above results demonstrate that the DTEM can
be formally verified by the method described as
formal verification, that is, encoding the DTEM in
a formula and solving it with an SMT solver. Moreover,
it was confirmed that the violation range can be extracted
by range extraction. It was also confirmed that using
range division makes it possible to narrow the violation
range. It can be therefore be concluded that the feasibility of
the proposed method was demonstrated.
Next, we evaluate the scalability of the proposed method.
If total execution time and execution time of the SMT solver
are focused on, it becomes clear that the time taken to execute
the SMT solver occupies most of the total execution time. In
other words, the execution time of the proposed method is
considered to be largely dependent on the execution time of
the SMT solver. As a factor that affects the execution time
of the SMT solver, for example, the number and depth of the
decision trees constituting M can be considered. However,
various heuristics are implemented and black-boxed in the
SMT solver, so it is difficult to predict how much these factors
affect the execution time of the SMT solver. Accordingly,
in this study, we change the value of the factor considered
to affect the execution time of the SMT solver and measure
the execution time. The following experiment uses the same
TABLE I
VIOLATION RANGES EXTRACTED BY THE PROPOSED METHOD
settings as described in Section VII-A unless otherwise stated.
Moreover, a practically acceptable execution time is assumed
as 24 hours, and the execution is aborted if it exceeds 24 hours.
1) (1) Number of decision trees: The number of decision
trees constituting M is represented by n est. In proportion to
the increase of n est, the number of paths of M increases.
The length of formula FM increases in proportion to the
number of paths of M . That is, with the increase of n est, the
length of the formula FM increases by O(n est). Therefore,
it is considered that the execution time of the SMT solver
tends to increase with the increase of n est. The execution
times of the proposed method when the value of n est was
changed are listed in Table II. The results in Table II show
that the execution time of the SMT solver tends to increase as
n est increases. As for the verification of ϕ2, timeout occurs
when n est ≥ 190. If the number of executions of the SMT
solver is focused on, it turns out that the SMT solver was
executed frequently in the case of ϕ2. In such a case, changing
parameters ra, rb, and rc may reduce the number of executions
of the SMT solver and, thereby, shorten the execution time.
Parameter ra determines the size of the search range in
range extraction. In the implementation shown in Equation
9, the smaller the value of ra is , the larger the search range is.
Therefore, the number of times to call formal verification
can be reduced if the value of ra is changed smaller. Note
that, in that case, it is highly likely that the extracted violation
range is wider than before decreasing ra. That is, the extracted
violation range includes more input values that do not violate
the property. rb is referred to as a reference value for de-
termining whether or not to execute range division. In the
implementation shown in Section VII-A, the larger the value of
rb is, the lower the possibility of dividing the violation range
is. Thus, the number of times to call formal verification
is reduced if the value of rb is changed larger. In that case,
however, the possibility of narrowing the violation range is
reduced. rc determines how many dividing orders are tried
in range division. Therefore, if the value of rc is changed
smaller, the number of times to call formal verification
decreases. We changed the values of these parameters to
ra = 20, rb = 30, and rc = 5 and then retried the
verification of ϕ2. Execution times before and after changing
the parameters are listed in Table III. As shown in Table III,
by changing the values of ra, rb, and rc, even in the case of
190 ≤ n est ≤ 220, execution of the SMT solver could be
completed without incurring the timeout. This demonstrates
that when execution cannot be completed within a practical
time due to the number of executions of the SMT solver,
the execution time can be shortened by adjusting the values
of these parameters. It should, however, be noted that when
these parameters are adjusted to reduce the execution time,
the extracted violation range may become wider. In fact, from
Table III, it turns out that the total volume of the violation
range is increased by changing the value of parameters. On
the contrary, it may be possible to narrow the violation range
more strictly by changing these parameters if it is acceptable
that the execution time become longer. That is, by changing
these parameters, it is possible to adjust the balance between
the fineness of the result and the execution time.
2) (2) Depth of decision trees: The maximum depth of
a decision tree is taken as max d. When the depth of a
decision tree increases by 1, the number of paths extracted
from one decision tree is doubled. (Moreover, the length of
each path also increases in proportion to max d.) Therefore,
the length of formula FM is of O(2max d). Accordingly, if
max d increases, it is considered that the execution time of
the SMT solver tends to increase. The execution times of the
TABLE II
EXECUTION TIME WHEN n est IS CHANGED
proposed method when the value of max d was changed are
listed in Table IV. It is clear from the results in Table IV that
the average execution time of the SMT solver increases as
max d increases. In particular, as for the verification of ϕ1
and ϕ2, the execution time increases by 10 to 100 times each
time max d increases by one. When time-out is invalidated
and ϕ1 is verified with max d = 5, it takes about 70 hours to
complete execution, and the average execution time of SMT
solver is about 46 seconds. From these results, it can be said
that max d has a big influence on the execution time of the
proposed method.
3) (3) Dimension of input value: The loop in line 9 of
range extraction in which formal verification is called
is executed by the number of dimension s. In addition, as
s increases, the number of variables appearing in FM also
increases, that is, FM becomes more complicated. For the
reasons above, it is considered that the execution time of
the SMT solver tends to increase with increasing s. In the
house-price dataset used in this study, we can use up to 18
attributes as elements of x. Therefore, these attributes was used
to change dimension s of x in the range of 2 ≤ s ≤ 18. The
execution times of the proposed method when the value of s
was changed are listed in Table V. It is clear from the results in
Table V that execution time tends to increases as s increases.
However, the execution time sometimes decreases though s
increases, for example, in the verificaiton of ϕ1, s = 14. In
other cases, execution time increases rapidly as when s = 13
in the verification of ϕ1. Therefore, the correlation of s with
the execution time is considered to be weaker than that of
n est and max d with execution time.
From the results in Table III, Table IV, and Table V, it
can be concluded that n est, max d, and s are factors that
increase the execution time of the proposed method. In partic-
ular, n est and max d are important factors that determines
the applicability of the proposed method. Specifically, the
proposed method is practical if n est is less than around 200
and max d is less than 5 at least.
VIII. DISCUSSION
As for the proposed method, the search range is set around
the violating input value detected first, and if a violating input
value exists within the search range, the search range is defined
as the violation range. Furthermore, by setting the search range
around the violation range, the violation range is expanded
in the same manner. After the violation range is extracted,
it is confirmed whether another violating input value exists
outside the violation range. If another violating input value
exists, the violation range is extracted in the same way starting
from that violating input value. In this manner, it is assured
that all violating input values fall within any violation range.
Therefore, by creating the input filter shown in Fig. 1 based
on the violation ranges extracted by the propsed method, all
violating input values leading to system failures can be filtered.
Moreover, as for the proposed method, the violation range
can be narrowed by dividing the extracted violation range.
Through a case study, the feasibility of the division of the vi-
olation range was confirmed. The extent to which the violation
range can be narrowed depends on the DTEM or the property
to be verified; thus, it is difficult to estimate the effectiveness
of the division in advance. However, dividing the violation
range is still useful to narrow the violation range on a trial
basis.
TABLE III
EXECUTION TIMES BEFORE AND AFTER CHANGING PARAMETERS
TABLE IV
EXECUTION TIMES IN CASE OF CHANGING max d
In the case study described in Section VII-B, it was shown
that the number of decision trees constituting the DTEM,
n est, maximum depth of the decision trees, max d, and
dimension s of the input value are factors that increase the
execution time of the proposed method. Among those factors,
max d has the greatest influence on the execution time. On
the other hand, the correlation of s with execution time is
considered to be relatively weak. Here, the length of the
formula FM is focused on. As mentioned above, FM becomes
longer by exponential order with increasing max d. On the
contrary, the length of FM does not change even if s increases.
From these facts, it is inferred that the execution time of the
proposed method strongly depends on the length of FM .
The purpose of the proposed method is creating the filtering
condition for the input filter. In that case, the proposed method
is required to complete execution within a practical time.
However, even if execution of the proposed method is not
completed within a practical time, the proposed method can be
utilized by outputting the violation range extended up to that
point when the execution was interrupted. The violation range
extracted at the time execution is suspended does not include
all violating input values. However, it is useful for realizing
where violating input values exist around. For example, it is
possible to use the input values included in the violation range
as training data for additionally training the DTEM. Thus,
the proposed method can be useful, even in the case of a
large-scale DTEM whose execution is not completed within
the practical time.
As described in Section I, as a method for obtaining the
condition to filter input value that violates a property, a
method that outputs all the violating input values can be
considered. However, for a certain violating input value, be a
large number of similar violating input values might exist, and
the values of some elements in them might be slightly changed.
Accordingly, from the viewpoint of calculation time, it is not
practical to detect all violating input values. Furthermore, as
TABLE V
EXECUTION TIMES IN CASE OF CHANGING DIMENSION s
another approach, extracting the path condition [29] of the
decision trees constituting DTEM is considered hereafter.
First, in the same manner as the proposed method, the
violating input value is detected by verification. If the detected
violating input value is input into the DTEM, the execution
path of each decision tree is uniquely determined. Here, the
condition of the input value to execute these paths is called
“path condition”. The path condition can be extracted by
executing the DTEM with the violating input value or by
analyzing the decision trees. If an input value satisfies the path
condition and it is input into the DTEM, the same paths are
executed as they are when the violating input value is input.
Moreover, if the same paths are executed, the same output
value is returned. Therefore, for all input values satisfying the
path condition, the DTEM returns the same output value. Here,
by assigning the output value to variable y appearing in the
property to be verified and negating the assigned property, a
conditional expression for the input value is created. For exam-
ple, let the output value be 499, 999, the conditional expression
of property ϕ1 is ¬(x[0] ≥ 7000⇒ 499999 ≥ 500000). If an
input value satisfies the conjunction of the path condition and
the conditional expression of the property, it means that the
corresponding output value is 499, 999, and at that time, the
property is not satisfied. Hereafter, the conjunction is called the
“violation condition.” By repeating the the above procedure,
other violation conditions can be extracted. Finally, the set of
the extracted violation conditions can be used as the filtering
condition of the input filter.
Since the violation condition extracted by this method
filters only input values that violate the property, this method
creates the filtering condition more precisely than the proposed
method. However, from the viewpoint of calculation time, this
method is considered to be less practical than the proposed
method because it is likely to extract a large number of
violation conditions. For example, in the case of a DTEM
composed of 100 decision trees with two paths each, there are
2100 combinations of paths, that is, about 1029 combinations.
The violation condition extracted in a single verification is
only one of the 1029 combinations, and it is highly likely that
there will be a large number of similar violation conditions in
which part of the path condition differs. In that case, since the
number of verifications by the SMT solver is also enormous,
this method is not practical.
In general, the fineness of the result and the execution time
have a trade-off relationship. As for the strategy to extend the
violation range, this trade-off relationship should be discussed.
As for the proposed method, the violation range is extended
in each direction of x[k] (0 ≤ k ≤ s − 1) in order. Hence,
violation ranges are extracted in the form of hyperrectangles.
The extension strategy of the proposed method is therefore
called a “hyperrectangle strategy.” Here, the mesh strategy
described below can be considered as a strategy for extracting
the violation range more precisely than the hyperrectangle
strategy. An example of extending the violation range accord-
ing to mesh strategy is shown in Fig. 7. As for this mesh
Fig. 7. Example of extending violation range by using mesh strategy
strategy, first, the space of input values is divided into meshes.
Then, the mesh including the violating input value ce is taken
as the initial violation range. Next, whether the violating input
value exists in the mesh adjacent to the violation range is
verified. If a violating input value exists in the adjacent mesh,
the adjacent mesh is taken into the violation range. Then, if
no violating input value exists in any mesh adjacent to the
violation range, the extension of the violation range is ended.
When this strategy is adopted, the number of adjacent meshes
increases as the violation range is extended. For example,
suppose that the violation range is an s-dimensional hypercube
and the number of meshes on one side of the violation range
is α. In this case, the number of adjacent meshes to the
violation range is 2s ∗αs−1. The verification is performed for
the number of adjacent meshes to extend the violation range by
one round. Therefore, the amount of calculation to extend the
violation range by one round increases as the violation range is
extended. On the other hand, in the case of the hyperrectangle
strategy, to extend the violation range by one round in the same
situation, the verification is performed only 2s times. That is,
it advantageous that the violation range can be extended with
a fixed amount of calculation regardless of the size of the
violation range.
Moreover, a strategy to increase the values of x[1], ..., x[s−
1] simultaneously can be considered. This strategy can extend
the violation range in a shorter time than the hyperrectangle
strategy. In this case, the violation range is extracted in the
form of a hypercube, so this strategy is called a “hypercube
strategy.” An example of extending the violation range on the
basis of the hypercube strategy is shown in Fig. 8. When the
Fig. 8. Example of extending violation range by using hypercube strategy
hypercube strategy is adopted, the number of verifications for
extending the violation range by one round is one. However,
the violation range extracted by the hypercube strategy is
coarser than that of other strategies. An example of the
extracted violation range for each strategy is shown in Fig.
9. The hypercube strategy is highly likely to include a range
in which no violating input value exists in the violation range.
Therefore, if an input filter is created based on the violation
range created by the hypercube strategy, many input values
satisfying the property will be filtered.
Fig. 9. Comparison of fineness of violation range
Finally, in terms of execution time, mesh strategies are
considered less practical than hyperrectangle strategies. The
hypercube strategy is considered to be less practical in terms
of the fineness of the results. Therefore, we adopted a hyper-
rectangle strategy with a good balance between the fineness
of the result and execution time.
As mentioned in Section VII-B, changing the values of ra,
rb, and rc makes it possible to adjust the balance between
fineness of the result and execution time. These parameters
should be changed by the user according to the DTEM and
property to be verified, and also allowable execution time.
As for finding an appropriate parameter value, the following
procedure can be considered. First, the parameter values are
set so that execution time is short, and it is confirmed by
actually executing the procedure that the execution time can
be shoter than the allowable time. After that, the parameters
are gradually changed to improve the fineness of the result.
This procedure improves the fineness of the results within the
constraints of execution time.
Among the proposed methods, range extraction and
range division are applicable to machine-learning models
other than a DTEM. On the contrary, formal verification
is a procedure specialized for a DTEM, so it must be to
replaced with a verification method suitable for the target
machine-learning model. For example, in the case of a DNN,
methods for encoding and verifying the DNN in a formula
have been proposed [15] [16] [17] [18] [14] [19]. By replacing
formal verification in the proposed method with such a
method, it is possible to extract the violation range of the
DNN.
IX. RELATED WORK
As described in Section I, Bogdiukiewicz et al. proposed a
method to develop a policing function for autonomous systems
[12]. The policing function checks output values of intelligent
function such as a machine learning model at runtime. The
policing function is useful to prevent failures as well as
the input filter. However, the policing function works after
the intelligent function executes. It means that the policing
function detects and controls the possible failure later than
the input filter. Therefore, the proposed method for creating
the input filter is more useful in develepment of systems which
require quick handling of failures.
In formal verification shown in Section IV, a rule-form
formula composed of conditions and conclusions is extracted
from the DTEM. Extracting a specification from a program
in the form of rules has been studied [22] [23] [24] [25] [26]
[27] [28]. In these studies, the control path of the program is
extracted by static analysis or symbolic execution, and the rule
is created on the basis of the branch condition that constitutes
the control path. The method proposed in this paper extracts
the decision tree path and creates a rule-form formula based
on the attribute test associated with the decision node that
composes the path. It can thus be said that it adopts the same
approach.
As for the verification of the rule-form formula, methods
have been established to verify properties such as consistency,
redundancy, and completeness [30]. Furthermore, a method for
extracting “minimal unsatisfiable subsets,” which are useful for
causal analysis when the rule set does not satisfy consistency,
has also been proposed [31] [32] [33]. Validation of rule
programs used in a business rule management system has also
been studied [35]. As in the case of the method proposed
in this paper, the verification of the the rule-form formula is
translated to checking the satisfiability problem.
Moreover, as described in Section I, an approach of encod-
ing a DNN model in a formula and verifying it by determining
the satisfiability of the formula has been proposed in recent
years [15] [16] [17] [18] [14] [19]. It can be said that the
method for verifying the DTEM proposed in this paper also
takes this approach. However, a study describing a specific
method for verifying a DTEM has not been reported. One of
the contributions of this paper is formally specifying a verifi-
cation method for a DTEM and demonstrating its feasibility
through a case study.
No similar studies on extracting violation ranges as de-
scribed in Section V and dividing violation ranges as described
in Section VI have been reported. One of the reasons for that
situation is that the problems solved by these methods are
unique to software developed by machine learning. In regard
to conventional software, namely, algorithmic programs, when
a counterexample is detected by verification, the fault that
caused the counterexample is analyzed, and the fault is re-
moved by correcting the algorithm. Verification and correction
are then repeated until no counterexample is detected. On
the other hand, in the case of a machine learning model,
a possible method for handling such faults is retraining or
additional training using the detected counterexample (and
data similar to it). Although this approach may eliminate
the fault, retraining and additional training may affect the
entire model, and another new fault may be inserted. That
is, “regression” occurs. Although this regression also occurs
in the case of algorithmic programs, in that case, regression
occurs due to a developer’s mistake; therefore, such mistakes
must be careful corrected to avoid regression. On the contrary,
in the case of a machine-learning model, it is difficult for
the developer to control retraining and additional training so
that regression does not occur. In other words, it can be said
that it is inherently difficult to create a complete machine-
learning model that always returns the expected output value.
Accordingly, when a machine-learning model is implemented
in a system, the proposed method is used to implement the
input filter. That is, the proposed method solves a specific
problem that occurs with the use of machine-learning models.
X. CONCLUSION
When a DTEM is implemented in a system, the input filter
can be effectively used to prevent system failures. As a means
of creating the filtering condition for the input filter, a method
for extracting the violation range of the DTEM, whose input
values are multi-dimensional vectors whose elements are nu-
meric variables, was proposed. The proposed method consists
of procedures for formally verifying the DTEM, extracting
the violation range, and narrowing the extracted violation
range. The violation range extracted by the proposed method
includes all violating input values. The proposed method is
therefore useful to create the filtering condition. After showing
the algorithms for these procedures, the results of a case
study using a dataset on the house prices were presented.
On the basis of the results of this case study, the feasibility
of the proposed method is demonstrated. Through the case
study, the scalability of the proposed method is also evaluated.
The number of decision trees constituting the DTEM, the
maximum depth of the decision trees, and the dimension of
the input value are factors that increase the execution time of
the proposed method. Specifically, it was concluded that the
proposed method is practical if the number of decision trees is
less than around 200 and the maximum depth of the decision
trees is less than 5 at least.
Future issues include improving the scalability of the pro-
posed method. Since the form of the formula FM created
by the proposed method is constant, the method’s scalability
may be improved by implementing heuristics specialized for
that form in the SMT solver. Moreover, the procedure for
finding appropriate values of parameters ra, rb, and rc shown
in Section VIII can be incorporated into the proposed method.
Furthermore, by adding case studies using other datasets, the
limitation of the proposed method can be evaluated in more
detail.
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